Node / ReticulumProjects / MeshChatX.git / files / SECURITY.md

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Tc9d1d9# Security Policy

Tc9d1d9## Contact Information

If you discover a security vulnerability or have concerns about the security of Reticulum MeshChatX, please contact the lead developer using the following methods in order of preference:

Tff7b721. **LXMF**: Ta5d6ff`7cc8d66b4f6a0e0e49d34af7f6077b5a`

For legal inquiries (non-security), contact Ta5d6ff`legal@quad4.io` or see [Ta5d6ff`LEGAL.md`](LEGAL.md).

Tc9d1d9## Security Overview

Reticulum MeshChatX is designed with a high degree of security and privacy in mind, leveraging multiple layers of protection and modern security practices.

We follow the [Tff7b72Electron Best Security Practices](Te6edf3https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/tutorial/security).

Tc9d1d9### Exposing to the public internet (with authentication)

MeshChatX is primarily intended for **local or trusted networks** (for example behind a home router or VPN). Putting the HTTP(S) UI on the **public internet** is **not recommended**: you enlarge the attack surface (credential stuffing, TLS and certificate management, reverse-proxy misconfiguration, automated scanning, and denial-of-service against the single-node service).

If you still choose to expose it, **enable authentication**, use **HTTPS** (valid certificates on the public name), restrict **who can reach the port** where possible (firewall allowlists, VPN, or a reverse proxy with additional controls), and keep the app **updated**. The application serves **`/robots.txt`** with **`Disallow: /`** (a hint to crawlers; it is not access control). The application includes **defence-in-depth** for the login and initial-setup endpoints: **per-IP rate limiting**, **lockout** after repeated failed passwords from an address (with **trusted client** recognition after a successful login so your own browsers are less likely to be blocked during broad attacks), **logging** of access attempts (IP, User-Agent, path, time) inspectable under **Debug Logs → Access attempts**, and session cookies configured as **HttpOnly** with **SameSite=Lax**. None of this removes the inherent risks of a public-facing service; it only reduces some abuse and accident scenarios.

Tc9d1d9### Core Security Features

Tff7b72- **ASAR Integrity Validation**: Utilizes Electron 39 features to protect the application against tampering.

Tff7b72- **Backend Binary Verification**: Generates a SHA-256 manifest of the unpacked Python backend during build and verifies it on every startup.

Tff7b72- **Data-at-Rest Integrity Monitoring**: Snapshots the state of identities and database files on clean shutdown and warns if they were modified while the app was closed.

Tff7b72- **CSP Hardening**: Multi-layered Content Security Policy protection across the entire application stack.

Tff7b72- **Hardened Electron Environment**: Hardened security by disabling Ta5d6ff`runAsNode` and Ta5d6ff`nodeOptions` environment variables via Electron Fuses.

Tff7b72- **Rootless Docker Images**: Support for running in restricted environments with rootless container images.

Tc9d1d9### Automated Security Measures

The project employs continuous security monitoring and testing:

Tff7b72- **Security Scanning**: Ta5d6ff`.gitea/workflows/scan.yml` runs on a weekly schedule and on pushes to Ta5d6ff`master` and Ta5d6ff`dev`. It installs frontend dependencies and runs **Trivy filesystem** vulnerabilities on the repo (Ta5d6ff`scripts/ci/trivy-fs-scan.sh`: high and critical severities, exit non-zero on findings), and **Trivy Dockerfile** misconfiguration (Ta5d6ff`trivy config --exit-code 1 Dockerfile`). The **Docker** workflow runs **Trivy** on the built image (Ta5d6ff`trivy image`) separately from that job.

Tff7b72- **Auth and path-safety tests**: Pytest covers HTTP **401** on protected Ta5d6ff`/api/*` when Ta5d6ff`auth_enabled` is on and no session (Ta5d6ff`tests/backend/test_notifications.py`), **ValueError** on backup/snapshot delete paths that escape storage (Ta5d6ff`tests/backend/test_security_path_and_backup.py`), and **schema upgrade** from version **N-1** (Ta5d6ff`tests/backend/test_schema_migration_upgrade.py`). Database **backup/restore** round-trips are covered in Ta5d6ff`tests/backend/test_database_snapshots.py`. Login and setup **rate limiting**, **lockout**, and **access attempt** logging are covered in Ta5d6ff`tests/backend/test_access_attempts_dao.py` and Ta5d6ff`tests/backend/test_access_attempts_enforcement.py` (including Hypothesis and HTTP smoke tests).

Tff7b72- **CI**: On pushes and pull requests, **`pip-audit`** (Python) and **Trivy** (Ta5d6ff`trivy fs` via Ta5d6ff`scripts/ci/trivy-fs-scan.sh`) run against the repository tree (including Node lockfiles and manifests after install where applicable).

Tff7b72- **Pinned Actions**: CI/CD workflows use pinned actions with full URLs to forked, vetted actions hosted on our Gitea instance (Ta5d6ff`git.quad4.io`) where an action is used at all.

Tff7b72- **Extensive Testing & Fuzzing**: Backend benchmarking and stress coverage to reduce instability and resource-exhaustion risks.

Tff7b72- **Linting & Code Quality**: Linting and static analysis run on CI paths.

Tc9d1d9## Release provenance

Tagged releases are built from Ta5d6ff`.gitea/workflows/build.yml`. Release assets include SHA256 sidecars (Ta5d6ff`.sha256` files next to each file) and a CycloneDX SBOM (Ta5d6ff`sbom.cyclonedx.json`). When the repository secret **`COSIGN_PRIVATE_KEY`** is set (PEM from Ta5d6ff`cosign generate-key-pair`, with **`COSIGN_PASSWORD`** if the key is encrypted), the workflow also produces **SLSA v1**-style cosign bundle files (Ta5d6ff`*.cosign.bundle`) next to each attested artifact.

Attestations are uploaded to the **Sigstore public transparency log (Rekor)** by default. The build runner must be able to reach the Rekor endpoint (default Ta5d6ff`https://rekor.sigstore.dev`; override with **`COSIGN_REKOR_URL`** if you use another instance).

Commit the cosign **public** key at the **repository root** as **`cosign.pub`** so others can verify without hunting for the key out of band.

Tc9d1d9### Signing key rotation

Rotate the signing key when it may be compromised or on an internal schedule (for example annually). Generate a new key pair, replace the **`COSIGN_PRIVATE_KEY`** (and password) secret in Gitea, and replace **`cosign.pub`** in the repository with the new public key. Releases built **before** rotation remain verifiable using the **old** public key kept alongside the download or in git history; document which key applies to which release tag if you maintain multiple keys.

Tc9d1d9## Verifying releases

Install **[cosign](https://docs.sigstore.dev/cosign/installation/)** for bundle verification. You need the **`cosign.pub`** file from the repository (same tag or Ta5d6ff`master` as the release you are checking).

Tc9d1d9### SHA256 checksums

Each released file has a sidecar Ta5d6ff`filename.sha256` containing the output of Ta5d6ff`sha256sum` (hex digest and filename). After downloading both files into the same directory:

Ta5d6ff```Ta5d6ffbash

sha256sum -c path/to/your-artifact.sha256

Ta5d6ff```

On macOS without GNU coreutils, compare the printed digest to Ta5d6ff`shasum -a 256 your-artifact` or use Ta5d6ff`openssl dgst -sha256 your-artifact`.

Tc9d1d9### Cosign attestation (SLSA v1 bundle)

From the repository root (so Ta5d6ff`scripts/ci/verify-release-attestation.sh` resolves), or with **`COSIGN_PUBLIC_KEY`** pointing at your copy of Ta5d6ff`cosign.pub`:

Ta5d6ff```Ta5d6ffbash

sh scripts/ci/verify-release-attestation.sh path/to/your-artifact path/to/your-artifact.cosign.bundle

Ta5d6ff```

This checks the signature and **Rekor** transparency-log inclusion for the attestation. If you intentionally use a private Sigstore deployment, set the same **`COSIGN_REKOR_URL`** (and any other Sigstore env vars) your builder used.

Tc9d1d9### Container images

Published images are built in Ta5d6ff`.gitea/workflows/docker.yml`. **OCI image cosign signing is not wired in that workflow yet.** Until it is, treat digest pinning as the main integrity check: pull or reference the image by **`@sha256:<digest>`** from a trusted manifest or registry UI, and optionally run **`trivy image`** against that digest. When cosign image signing is added, verification will look like:

Ta5d6ff```Ta5d6ffbash

cosign verify --key cosign.pub <registry>/<image>@sha256:<digest>

Ta5d6ff```

(Exact flags may depend on keyless versus key-based signing; follow the release notes when signing lands.)